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IS THE COMMON LAW RULE OF PUBLICATION
IN A CIVIL ACTION FOR LIBEL CHANGED
BY A STATUTE MAKING THE DELIVERY
OF THE LIBELOUS MATTER TO THE
PLAINTIFF ALONE A SUFFICIENT
PUBLICATION FOR THE PUR-
POSE OF CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION?
It seems to be settled law that, in the absence of a statute, the
sending of a libelous letter or document to the plaintiff himself,
and read by no one else, does not give rise to a civil action for
damages. In order to recover, the plaintiff must show that there
has been a publication. A very important question has arisen in
several States where statutes have been enacted making the deliv-
ery of a libelous letter to the plaintiff alone a sufficient publication,
for which he may be criminally prosecuted. Does a statute of this
kind change the common law rule of publication in a-civil action
for libel?
We have in Missouri a statute of this kind. Section 4820,
Revised Stat. Mo., 1909, provides:
"No printing, writing or other thing is a libel unless
there has been a publication thereof, 'by delivering, selling,
reading or otherwise communicating the same or causing
the same to be delivered, sold, or read or otherwise com-
municated to one or more persons or to the party libeled,"
etc.
There are three cases in this State in which the courts have
attempted to construe this statute with reference to civil actions
for libel. The first case 1 was one in which appellant in the Kansas
City Court of Appeals questioned the sufficiency of plaintiff's
petition. The petition complained of contained two counts. The
first count alleged in substance that the defendant wrongfully and
maliciously wrote, composed and sent to the plaintiff a certain
letter containing wicked and scandalizing language, etc. The sec-
ond count contained the following allegations: "And plaintiff
says that the said defendant did publish the contents of said letter
abroad to, and in the hearing of divers and sundry persons by
reason of which libelous publication," etc. The court upheld both
1 Houston v. Wooley, 37 Mo. App. 15.
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counts, holding that the common law rule as to publication of a
libel was changed by statute in this State.
This construction was later adopted by the St. Louis Court
of Appeals.2 In that case, the plaintiff had authorized the North
American Mercantile Agency Co. to act as his agent in the matter
of a claim against the defendant company. In replying to a com-
munication of this agent the defendant company wrote some
libelous matter concerning the plaintiff. The lower court sustained
a demurrer to the plaintiff's petition, which in substance alleged
that in reply to the demand made by the plaintiff's agent defendant
wrote a libelous letter of and concerning plaintiff to his said agent
and that the said letter was read by the agents and employes of
the Mercantile Co. The defendant contended that the publication
of the letter to the agent of the plaintiff was tantamount to a
publication to plaintiff himself and that the demurrer was rightly
sustained by the court. Judge Allen, however, says: "This argu-
ment is predicated upon the common law rule respecting publica-
tion, but we have a statute in this State (Sec. 4820, R. S. Mo.,
1909) * * * And in consequence of this statute it has been
held that: the writing and sending of a libelous writing to the
libeled himself is a publication," citing the earlier decision of the
Kansas City Court of Appeals.
The Springfield Court of Appeals in a recent case takes a
contra view. In this case, the defendant demurred to plaintiff's
petition on the ground that there was no cause of action stated.
The allegation complained of was as follows:
"Defendant uttered and published and caused and procured
to be delivered to plaintiff a certain writings" etc. The defendant
argued that there was no publication charged, while the plaintiff
urged that undcr our statute there was a sufficient publication even
if the writing was delivered to him only. The court refused to
follow the earlier cases and stated that, "Section 4820 R. S. 1909,
making the delivery of libelous matter to the party libeled a publi-
cation thereof for the purpose of conviction in a criminal case,
has not changed the common law rule governing actions in tort for
libel, which requires that in order to be a publication the libelous
matter must be made known or come to the attention of some one
other than the principals, and ruled this contention against
appellant.
A careful review of these cases, however, will show that in
none of them was a construction of the statute referred to neces-
I Wright v. R. R. Co., 186 S. W. 1085.
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sary for a decision. In the first case a sufficient common law
publication was charged in the second count of the petition, and
the decision might well have been put on that ground. In the
second case, the publication of the libel might well have been
based on the ground that it was shown to the agent of the party
libeled, who was a third person, and as the Springfield Court of
Appeals says, "We know of no such relation of agency as being
an agent to receive a libel."
While the decision of the Springfield Court of Appeals seems
to be the best considered one, we think that it was hardly neces-
sary to construe the statute. The question that was before the
court was whether or not plaintiff's petition was good against a
general demurrer which the lower court sustained. The court
holds that the allegation complained of was not demurrable
because of a statute 4 which provides that in actions for libel it
shall not be necessary to state in the petition any extrinsic facts,
"but it shall be sufficient to state generally that the same was
published concerning the plaintiff." In view of this statutory
provision the court held the allegation above referred to sufficient
and that the plaintiff could at the trial bring in testimony as to
what person or persons had been informed of the contents of the
libelous writing.
Although there has been no direct decision on this point by
our Supreme Court, we submit that the dicta of the Springfield
Court of Appeals is more persuasive in its reasoning. In neither
of the two earlier cases was the question treated at great length,
the court assuming that the proposition was too ,clear to need any
elucidation. Furthermore, the Springfield court is supported in its
contention by a well-considered Federal decision, which involved
the construction of a Tennessee statute almost exactly like the
Missouri one. It will be noted that, just as in the Federal case,
the Missouri statute appears in the chapter on "Crimes and Punish-
ments," and that Sections 4818 and 4819, respectively, define a
libel and declare same to be a misdemeanor. We think that the
three sections ought to be read together, the first one defining a
libel, the second declaring a libel to be a crime or misdemeanor,
and the third providing what shall be deemed a publication for
the purpose of convicting one of the misdemeanor.
JOSEPH H. GRAND.
3Howard v. Wilson, 192 S. W. 473.
41. S. Mo. 1909, 1937.
5 Warnoels v. Mitchel, 43 Fed. 428.
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